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A theoretical framework is developed based on the premise that brains evolved into su±ciently
complex adaptive systems capable of instantiating genomic consciousness through self-aware-
ness and complex interactions that recognize qualitatively the controlling factors of biological
processes. Furthermore, our hypothesis assumes that the collective interactions in neurons yield
macroergic e®ects, which can produce su±ciently strong electric energy ¯elds for electronic
excitations to take place on the surface of endogenous structures via alpha-helical integral
proteins as electro-solitons. Speci¯cally the process of radiative relaxation of the electro-solitons
allows for the transfer of energy via interactions with deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) molecules to
induce conformational changes in DNA molecules producing an ultra weak non-thermal
spontaneous emission of coherent biophotons through a quantum e®ect. The instantiation of
coherent biophotons con¯ned in spaces of DNA molecules guides the biophoton ¯eld to be
instantaneously conducted along the axonal and neuronal arbors and in-between neurons and
throughout the cerebral cortex (cortico-thalamic system) and subcortical areas (e.g., midbrain
and hindbrain). Thus providing an informational character of the electric coherence of the brain
 referred to as quantum coherence. The biophoton ¯eld is realized as a conscious ¯eld upon
the re-absorption of biophotons by exciplex states of DNA molecules. Such quantum phe-
nomenon brings about self-awareness and enables objectivity to have access to subjectivity in
the unconscious. As such, subjective experiences can be recalled to consciousness as subjective
conscious experiences or qualia through co-operative interactions between exciplex states of
DNA molecules and biophotons leading to metabolic activity and energy transfer across pro-
teins as a result of protein-ligand binding during protein-protein communication. The bio-
photon ¯eld as a conscious ¯eld is attributable to the resultant e®ect of specifying qualia from
the metabolic energy ¯eld that is transported in macromolecular proteins throughout speci¯c
networks of neurons that are constantly transforming into more stable associable representa-
tions as molecular solitons. The metastability of subjective experiences based on resonant
dynamics occurs when bottom-up patterns of neocortical excitatory activity are matched with
top-down expectations as adaptive dynamic pressures. These dynamics of on-going activity
patterns in°uenced by the environment and selected as the preferred subjective experience in
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terms of a functional ¯eld through functional interactions and biological laws are realized as
subjectivity and actualized through functional integration as qualia. It is concluded that
interactionism and not information processing is the key in understanding how consciousness
bridges the explanatory gap between subjective experiences and their neural correlates in the
transcendental brain.
Keywords: Hard problem; consciousness; DNA functioning; subjective experience; biological
laws; energy ¯elds; resonance; qualia; solitons; coherent biophotons; interactionism; quantum
coherence.
1. Introduction
\Science is imagination in the service of veri¯able truth. . .. And in fact,
there are some times when imagination leads to a world change".
Gerald M. Edelman
The ultimate understanding of consciousness must re°ect upon the emergence of
subjective experiences, not at subjective conscious experiences that are being created
by the actions and feelings which have no signi¯cant bearing on the realizations of
raw perceptions of subjective conscious experiences or qualia. The self-referential
qualities of consciousness that philosophers call the experiential and subjective
aspects occur in conscious life that appears to recognize \self" or self-awareness as
opposed to any re°exive organism's behavior is here referred to as consciousness.
Subjective experiences are contingent on consciousness yet require complex inter-
actions to take place across scale.
Subjective experiences belong to the realm of quantum phenomena including
¯rst-person ontology. They arise from complex interactions at the unconscious level
to the more complex conscious experiences. We de¯ne aconsciousa in reference to
the emergence of this phenomenological entity as being a biological phenomenon
that is not repressed and not recalled to consciousness as is commonly associated
with unconscious (Freud, 1915). It should be emphasized that aconscious subjective
experiences are not the conscious interpretation of the emerged subjective conscious
experiences because interpretation involves cognition, comprising cognitive se-
mantics. Aconscious subjective experiences occur in living beings, but in the ma-
jority of cases, such experiences can occur without conscious interpretation. The
realization of the subjective conscious experiences from the aconscious subjective
experiences is referred to as the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995).
The recursive look into the subjectivity of consciousness captures account of
\selfhood" its own being, felt and perceived from within hence it is ¯rst-person
ontology on subjective nature of experience that endures through time. In contrast,
there is an epistemological view which corresponds to third-person form of knowing.
It focuses on physical concepts that have objective descriptions involving biological
and physiological knowledge. Further, physical conceptualization also includes
aThis name was originated by Franco Orsucci.
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psychological knowledge (such as ¯ndings from psychophysical experiments) whose
attribution do not contain mental descriptions. Consequently, philosophers con-
strued this knowledge argument that there is an explanatory gap in introspecting
¯rst- and third-person ontology (Levine, 1983). It is only a \gap" in the sense that
there is only a rudimentary understanding between subjective experiences and the
neuroscienti¯c or objective descriptions of those conceptual self-referential experi-
ences. This can be rea±rmed as how a transcendental brain that is non-experiential
can fathom subjective experiences that have ¯rst-person ontology, such as redness;
whereas dynamics and structure refer to third-person ontology, such as detection
and discrimination of long wavelength light. To put it di®erently, the phenomenal
concept to explain the experiential aspect of mind (Carruthers & Veillet, 2007;
Levin, 2006, 2008) appears as a quick-¯x solution to the mind–body problem de¯ned
to be the problem about how phenomenal concepts like subjective experiences and
qualia relate to the brain. First-person ontology such as subjectivity, creativity,
feelings, intelligence, self-awareness and intentionality does not need an explicit
mentioning of the mind, since it includes subjective experience as a fundamental
property of the functioning of the brain that is performed through operations that
have causal relations to physical processes that have an objective nature or third-
person ontology.
Consciousness is quite subtly characterized to be reducible to physical processes
at either quantum level or at the level of large-assemblies of populations of neurons.
At the nanoscale, Hamero® & Penrose (2014) have hypothesized quantum gravity
e®ects inside microtubules known as orchestrated objective reduction (Orch-OR)
theory associated with quantum vibrations in microtubules the primary correlate
of description of consciousness. At the mesoscopic scale, Tononi (2012) hypothesized
consciousness as resulting from large-scale integration of information in the brain
resulting from its complex neuronal connections of large assemblies of specially
selected groups or populations of neurons (Edelman & Tononi, 1995). However,
both reductionist models and information theoretic models of consciousness (Bal-
duzzi & Tononi, 2009; Tononi, 2008, 2010, 2012; Tononi & Sporns, 2003) are
problematic. The Orch-Or theory cannot explain the spontaneity of consciousness
that requires quantum entanglements (i.e., a connectedness of states, such as elec-
tron spins) to successfully bridge the gap between nanoscale and large-scale neural
network events in the brain; while the information theoretic models explain the
qualitative character of experience rather than consciousness itself (Peressini, 2013).
Moreover, if consciousness is a biological phenomenon that emerges from the func-
tioning of the brain that supervenes upon the dynamical processes originating in the
brain and realized in brain structures (Searle, 2000), then the information theoretic
framework of consciousness is °awed because there is a con°ict in epistemology.
Searle (2007) refers to consciousness as a biological phenomenon which he labeled
as \biological naturalism" to explain in naturalistic terms that there is nothing in the
brain that does not supervene upon the physical processes. The basic ideas in
biological naturalism are:
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(a) Consciousness cannot function causally in the production of physical behavior
(i.e., consciousness has no causal powers);
(b) Neuronal processes can function causally in the production of consciousness (i.e.,
consciousness is reducible to neuronal processes);
(c) Consciousness is ontologically irreducible (i.e., consciousness has a ¯rst person
ontology).
Under (a) the ¯ring of a neuron can always be explained in terms of the ¯ring of other
neurons, which will be added to all of the other inputs of that neuron, to formulate
behavioral responses to those ¯rings, but not as a result of a subjective experience. To
put it together, processes such as neuronal ¯ring leads to functions that are subjective
processes such as experience of painfulness and these experiences do not interact di-
rectly with physical processes such as ¯ring of pain related neurons. Under (b) con-
sciousness is an ordinary physical system that is somewhat conscious or perceived as
self-sensation as opposed to a separate property that the brain \gives rise to". For
instance, the opening of ligand-gated ionic channels in the postsynaptic membrane is
reversibly blocked by anesthetics resulting in loss of consciousness. The di®erence
between property dualism and biological naturalism is that (c) entails that con-
sciousness is a nonphysical emergent property of the brain that is \over and above" the
neuronal phenomena, while Searle (2007) advocates that it is a brain state. Biological
naturalism has been extended to neurobiological naturalism by Feinberg (2012).
Equally important, is the argument against biological naturalism, the causal
powers of large-scale integration in the brain can support dualism because if it would
be possible to reproduce arti¯cial consciousness which would imply a dualistic view of
the nature of causal powers (Haugeland, 1980). However, Chalmers (1996) claims that
subjective experiences are determined by, but not identical to, the functional orga-
nization of physical processes in the brain. Therefore if large-scale integration in the
brain were to be reproduced arti¯cially as a requirement for intrinsically connecting
with the physical elements inherent in the brain, then it would suggest that subjective
experiences cannot be expressed as suggested by biological naturalism. In the light of
Chalmers' (1996) nonreductive functionalism, subjective experiences supervene upon
the physical processes in the brain, like the function of ligand-gated ionic channels
supervene upon the physical processes such as ionic transmission across membranes.
In nonreductive functionalism, the relevant functions can be realized in one substrate
as opposed to multiple substrates. Therefore the limitation of multiple realizability
which is an essential tool rather than a thesis of functionalism, opens the possibility of
the same function being realized by di®erent structures, but multiple realizability is
not an explanatory theory of nonreductive functionalism of mental states meaning
that subjectivity supervenes upon the physical processes in the brain. Functionalism is
against such multiple realizations. In nonreductive functionalism, subjectivity is ir-
reducible to individual functions arising in the aconscious and therefore it binds into a
seamless whole as a functional ¯eld that allows for subjective experiences to be
recalled to consciousness as qualia. This functional ¯eld is not a vitalist concept of
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function as a teleological ¯eld that is independent of the structure and intrinsic ac-
tivity (dynamics) of the system. The functional ¯eld is not a \conscious mental ¯eld"
in the sense of Libet (1996) which would emerge as a function of neural activities in the
brain and it would have the attribute of a subjective conscious experience. Rather it is
the resultant e®ect of qualia in the aconscious attributed to the dynamical interac-
tions of brain processes.
An understanding of the role that physical processes have in subjective experiences
and the extent to which these processes play in subjective conscious experiences
requires an understanding of the following:
(a) Computational models of brain functioning (Izhikevich & Edelman, 2008; Elia-
smith et al., 2012; Stewart & Eliasmith, 2014) lack subjective experiences and
therefore the possibility for sentient awareness (MacGregor, 2006);
(b) Modeling subjectivity through computational neuroscience (Taylor, 2009) is
problematic since it de¯es the existence of the hard problem;
(c) There are conceptual problems of highly conceivable and realistic single neuron
consciousness models (Edwards, 2005; Sevush, 2006; LaBerge & Kasevich, 2007);
(d) The creation of brain models that reconcile all possible knowledge, at present and
in the future, en route for continuing improvement in accuracy until eventually
the \brain in a supercomputer" model will encounter series of problems with
reductionism (Feinberg, 2012).
Information processing is governed through dynamics of physical interactions that
transform the information into a new format. This argument of information theoretic
integration is that physical signals that carry information, which is not conscious, is
accomplished through interactions between physical signals in the third-person
ontology, where all information is dynamic and the dynamical interactions lead to a
dynamic core (Tononi & Edelman, 1998), and that is a problem because information
processing depends on a speci¯ed algorithm a priori.
Subjective experiences are asserted as byproducts of mental processes that emerged
from or realized by complex interactions in the brain. It is important to realize that the
sources of consciousness are intrinsically intertwined with functioning of the brain and
understanding how these self-referential qualities emerge from neural events in the
brain is a ¯rst step in solving the hard problem of consciousness and ultimately the
mind–body problem. It was Chalmers (1993) who ¯rst suggested that consciousness
requires a foundational theory and that theory is likely to be one that combines both
qualitative and quantitative elements (Seth et al., 2006). However, before any such
theory can be developed, there needs to be a model in which subjective experiences can
be articulated from the emerging physics of consciousness (Tuszynski, 2006). To make
progress requires us to solve the hard problem by not reducing qualia to the objective
entities of neural processes, but rather by including qualia as part of a theoretical
model where subjective experiences are assumed to emerge from neuronal processes.
In a recent review article, Feinberg & Mallatt (2013) assert that consciousness
evolved over half a billion years across phyla of vertebrates and genes someway
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\pattern" the proposed elements of consciousness through neural interactions. Un-
fortunately their work avoided the intricacies of cognition and quantum-based
approaches to consciousness. In this paper, we accept the evolutionary and genetic
origins of consciousness and go further by discribing the subcellular loci where con-
sciousness originates and how it may occur in the brain as quantum biological pro-
cesses. We do not make the category error and say atoms or subatomic particles are
conscious, but we proclaim that consciousness emerges from quantum phenomena
moving upward to neural networks and systems of networks. Furthermore, we discuss
how subjectivity in neocortical functioning is connected with consciousness actualized
as self-awareness. Thus our purpose is to give a conceptual underpinning of how sub-
jective experiences arise from neural processes as being dependent upon the complex
interactions resulting from quantum events giving rise to a \stream" of consciousness.
2. A Triple-Aspect Monistic Model in Terms of Dynamics,
Selectionism and Cognitive Function
Subjectivity seems to originate at a di®erent interface between natural understanding
and logical formulation -between quantum electrodynamical interactions in deoxyr-
ibonucleic acid (DNA) molecules and the residual complex interactions resulting from
such events, which serve as the carriers of subjectivity. In order to point to a causal
physical link between subjective experience and neocortical function a model of the
brain is proposed. The theoretical framework is built upon interactionism through the
segregation of subjective concepts from physical properties and their entanglement as
functional con¯gurations. A quantum description of the brain as a complex adaptive
system was ¯rst published by Ricciardi & Umezawa (1967).
Here we consider a triple-aspect monistic model that has profound association of
three aspects that are inseparable (spatiotemporally), yet phenomenologically segre-
gated. This triple aspect monism views that some entities constitute (i) uncognized
functions of the self-referential organization consisting of subjective concepts, (ii)
cognizable brain functions of the functional organization consisting of functional
concepts and (iii) cognitive semantics of the relational organization consisting of
physical concepts. The interrelationship between the three aspects is \sui generis". It
cannot be causal in the ordinary sense of \e±cient causation" (as the action of forces
between two bodies) because the aspects are not spatiotemporally separated across any
level. Peirara Jr. (2013) referred to these interactions as \sensitive" and \a®ective".
Most philosophers call the interaction from relational to functional organization as
\causation" and understanding these interactions is referred to as the mind–body
problem, while interactions from self-referential to functional organization are referred
to as \realization" and such is also claimed to be the hard problem of consciousness
(Chalmers, 2006). The possibility that this model could imply non-causal interactions
between the three aspects should also be considered probable. The interconnectedness
of the three organizations (hierarchically functional, self-referential and relational)
constitutes a triple-aspect monistic model of the brain (see Fig. 1).
258 L. A. CACHA & R. R. POZNANSKI
J. 
In
te
gr
. N
eu
ro
sc
i. 
20
14
.1
3:
25
3-
29
2.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.c
om
by
 W
SP
C 
on
 0
7/
29
/1
4.
 F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
Fig. 1. A triple-aspect monistic model of the brain as a complex adaptive system. Subjective experi-
ences are expressed through a self-referential organization that realizes conscious subjective experiences
or qualia through a hierarchically based functional organization which is causally augmented with a
relational organization that supports semantics stored in the neural processes of the brain. Relational
organization refers to the physical concepts like semantics and functional organization refers to cog-
nizable concepts like qualia, while self-referential organization refers to uncognized concepts like sub-
jective experiences. Hierarchical integration (i.e., across scale) occurs during development (i.e.,
ontogenesis) indirectly a®ecting structural neural connectivity by modulating dynamic connectivity and
by producing a new dynamic process  dynamic continuity enhanced by energy ¯eld interactions in
neurons and across synapses. Post-ontogenically dynamical connectivity, dynamical continuity and
environmental in°uences through dynamic adaptability lead to hierarchical and functional integration.
The left side of the chart is associated with third-person ontology, while the right side re°ects ¯rst-
person ontology. A physical organization of brain function is non-existent, contrary to common beliefs,
that brain functions are con¯ned to certain ¯xed locations in ordinary Cartesian space. Self-organization
is assumed to have originated at the molecular level and is therefore observed at higher hierarchical
levels to be a random process, but the transition from molecular to cellular hierarchical levels invokes a
non-computational or non-algorithmic process that is not necessarily random and often associated with
quantum mechanical indeterminacy. The dotted lines between structural organization, neuroelec-
trodynamics and developmental selection indicate ontogenesis. Self-replication occurs through explicit
speci¯cation in the o®spring via DNA encoding. Explicit speci¯cation remains the only brain operation
that is hardwired through phylogenetic evolution. Physical processes, biophysical processes, and bio-
logical processes are similar kinds of neuronal processes that are dynamical processes.
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2.1. Dynamics
The interaction between protein structures imbedded in a nerve membrane or inside
a neuron plays a key functional role determining the topological or spatial distri-
bution of proteins and the connectivity of neural networks. During ontogenesis there
are complex interactions brought into existence due to ionic concentration di®erences
between di®erent sites of the cytoplasm that harbor endogenous electromagnetic
energy ¯elds involving ionic interactions in macromolecules that can store and
transfer information. Physical interactions within neurons at the molecular level
bring on the integration process (Aur & Jog, 2010; Aur et al., 2011). This is how
causation in the brain allows for physical concepts like cognitive semantics to emerge.
There is a continuous electrically charged °ow of information that is carried by the
electric ¯eld across synapses and within neurons. This dynamic continuity is mani-
fested and results in a dynamic ¯eld of in°uence for augmenting cognitive processes in
assemblies of neural networks (see Cacha & Poznanski, 2011). Without dynamic
continuity, the integration processes would be impossible since in principle, to inte-
grate across scale, it is essential for dynamic continuity to be capable of transferring
information. This is known as neuroelectrodynamics (Aur & Jog, 2010).
The determination of the dynamic interactions entails traversing hierarchical
levels of structural organization, which over time converges to a dynamic core
(Tononi & Edelman, 1998) as networks of associable representations (Cacha &
Poznanski, 2011). Post-ontogenically dynamical interactions of these energy ¯elds
inside neurons and across synapses leads to the transfer of information in neural
networks, adaptive in°uences of the environment and what is referred to as dy-
namical continuity. The establishment of dynamic continuity is central in controlling
a more or less ordered albeit malleable post-ontogenic neural organization leading to
a hierarchically based functional organization which supports multi-hierarchical and
distinct function that is in°uenced by this dynamical continuity in the spatiotem-
poral dynamics of energy ¯eld interactions inside neurons and across synapses.
Synapses are essential for dynamic continuity to prevail across large networks of
assemblies through the act of changing °ow patterns in addition to disrupting the
°ow pattern in distinct associable representation resulting in a dynamic ¯eld aug-
menting cognitive processes in assemblies of networks. The conceptual interpretation
of dynamical ¯elds is that they represent guiding \templates" of the dynamical
nature of neural assemblies through changes to dynamical continuity. If a dynamic
¯eld results from synaptic interactions and electrical interactions inside and between
neurons (non-synaptic), then spiking in neurons maybe insu±cient for elucidating
high-order cognitive functions. Traversing hierarchical levels of structural organi-
zation corresponds to structural discontinuity (i.e., a structural border between
di®erent scales). Structural, discontinuities result in the non-locality of the global
dynamical ¯eld. In a space without structural discontinuity, dynamical ¯elds are
local. The non-local process allows for the passage from a structure in which phe-
nomena are local to another. Then, the di±culty of the formalized description results
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from this discontinuity in which dynamical ¯elds are di®erent, but necessary for the
transport of the interaction.
Dynamic connectivity refers to the integration between micro-, meso- and macro-
dynamical interactions across spatiotemporal scales. The frequency of ¯ring at syn-
apses can invoke dynamic connectivity formed by changes to the electrochemical
signature that is modulated globally by continuous distributions of spatial patterns
of dynamic ¯eld activity through volume transmission. This is what is loosely referred
to as dynamic connectivity (Breakspear, 2004; Jirsa &McIntosh, 2007). For instance,
a physical correlative in the form of neural activity in the cerebral cortex produces an
activity in an overlapping dynamic ¯eld so that their integration yields new dynamic
connectivity. These changes to electrochemical signature over broad areas of cerebral
cortex, both are changing the electrochemical signature, which is local and fast in
addition to global and slow to guide the dynamics associated with self-organization of
textured neural activity that supports cognition (Freeman, 2005).
The mechanism by which changes to synaptic e±ciency en route for synaptic
connections bring about dynamic connectivity involves a dynamical process that
invokes excitatory changes through synaptic plasticity. Post-ontogenic pressures
governing dynamical connectivity could in essence re°ect the coordinated ¯ring pat-
terns observed in neural assemblies. It is equivalent in some sense to \re-entry" in the
theory of neuronal group selection (Edelman, 1978, 1981, 1987)  a term used to
represent dynamic connectivity between neuronal groups of strongly connected neu-
ronal assemblies. However, dynamical connectivity alone is insu±cient to describe a
non-computational process as advanced by neural Darwinism without adaptive be-
havior based on selectionism. The hypothesis is that selectivity triggered by neural
activity (dependent on the dynamics of the signal and the phenotypic adaptability)
produces a hierarchically manifested pressure referred to as \dynamic adaptability". It
is characterized by a non-random adaptive pressure (Bruzzo & Vimal, 2007) for the
purpose of creating a function across hierarchical levels of functional organization.
Dynamic adaptability as a non-computational process is independent of structural
constraints (e.g., involving \wireless" volume transmission) and is an ill-de¯ned pro-
cess in°uenced by the environment. Brain functions utilize dynamic adaptability
governed by a selective process to integrate functional interactions leading to the
formation of a functional ¯eld. Dynamic adaptability generates adaptive pressures
aided by modulatory environments consisting of \silent-signals" not obviously visible
as well as ¯eld e®ects which can modulate the excitability of neural assemblies (i.e.,
non-local interneuronal interactions at the mesoscopic level of functional organiza-
tion), and other non-classical forms of signaling (e.g., Harris-Warrick & Marder, 1991;
Bullock, 1993, 1997). The selective process by which this occurs is an open research
problem, but if quantum coherence is believed to have a role, then such quantum
e®ects need not traverse across the synaptic barrier, but possibly through the extra-
cellular °uid via the volume transmission mode of electrochemical communication
(Fuxe & Agnati, 1991). The possibility of microtubules via a quantum mechanical
e®ect (Hamero®, 1994a,b) could be an example of dynamic adaptability. Such e®ects
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in arrays of dendritic microtubules have been associated with \quantum con-
sciousness" (Stenger, 1993; Tuszynski, 2006).
2.2. Selectionism
Natural selection has provided us a universal frame of meaning into understanding
the human brain. Evolution by natural selection in the context of the brain has been
referred to as \selectionism" (Sporns & Tononi, 1994). Selectionism forms an integral
feature of neuronal group selection theory and is a dynamic process that is pre-
dominant during brain development (Frank & Wenner, 1993). Selectionism trans-
cends between \developing" and \mature" neural activities (Sporns, 1997). Its
operations are in turn governed by the processes of self-organization, appropriately
modeled through synchronization and coherency in synergetics (Haken, 1996). The
process whereby self-organization installs \neural" connectivity has been discussed
by Willshaw & von Malsburg (1976). However, the hypothesis that self-organization
(not combined with explicit speci¯cation) directly sets up synaptic connectivity in
brain development is doubtful. Genetic speci¯cations of codes for the replication of
instructions are transferred between generations by DNA sequences encoded via
explicit speci¯cation (Watson & Crick, 1953). Evidence that neurogenesis is mech-
anistically de¯ned (Caroni, 1998) makes it strongly plausible that explicit speci¯-
cation is governed by instructions generated by DNA sequence encoding (i.e.,
involving pre-existing patterns of the extracellular chemical forces and the DNA in
the cell nucleus). Explicit speci¯cation, however, speci¯es structures via DNA
encoding and does not a®ect directly the dynamic processes leading to brain func-
tions. It is known that (i) DNA is the chemical basis of heredity (McCarty, 1985), (ii)
DNA and genes are genuine units of selection (Crick, 1990), (iii) genes that transmit
information between generations require the presence of regulatory interactions that
are governed by a more complex mechanism for information °ow than proposed by
the central dogma of molecular biology (Crick, 1970), (iv) conformational changes in
DNA molecules are important for understanding DNA functioning (Frank-Kame-
netskii & Lazurkin, 1974) and (v) DNA is capable of emitting coherent photons
(Rattemeyer et al., 1981). This view supports a neural Darwinian ontogeny, but the
process during post-ontogenesis is more dynamic rather than purely selective
meaning that repeated cycles of a particular functional trait do not result in a per-
manent bias toward such a trait during the life span of the organism, as it would
occur under a purely selectionist model.
Based on neural Darwinism, two distinct processes of selection through variation
have been postulated (Edelman, 1987): (i) during embryonic development, neural
populations form groups with strong synaptic connections and the environment
exerts selectional pressure as a result of diversity, variance and imprecision of the
synaptic connections. The majority of anatomical connections are not functionally
expressed via so-called developmental selection processes. (ii) After ontogenesis in
which both structural and functional modules are continually modi¯ed, new groups
form through the so-called experiential selection process (Edelman, 1983). A
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corollary of this latter selectionism is that selection applied to neuronal populations
in which selection processes shape synaptic connectivity and hence dynamic con-
nectivity (Reeke & Sporns, 1990; Reeke, 1994). What processes govern selectionist
theories? If synapses transfer signals indi®erently by a similar chemical modulation,
then what determines a weak synapse as opposed to a strong synapse? This question
was not fully explored in Edelman's work. If selectionist theories do not require a rule
for selecting the appropriate \re-entry" path, then such a process must be assumed to
depend on some adaptive behavior. Indeed, Calvin (1998) de¯ned a \Darwinian
process" as one \. . .capable of recursively bootstrapping random novelties into
something of quality". Calvin's key point is that depletion of variability would result
in the discontinuation of selection and thus must remain an essential component of
the neuronal adaptive strategy (Sporns & Tononi, 1994). Although from the neural
Darwinian perspective, the output of the system as a whole is of an adaptive value
to the organism (Reeke et al., 1990), in the population approach it is di±cult to
generalize at the individual neuron level (Edelman, 1995).
The tenet of neural Darwinism is that selection through variance has provided
insights to the brain's structural and functional organizations and other processes of
perception. It is through variance in neuroanatomy and through neural dynamics
that essential features related to brain function are established. Dynamically
evolving groups of assemblies of distinct multiple neuronal populations are more
likely to be associated with dynamic continuity. It would seem plausible that the
formation of neuronal groups during ontogenesis leads to a particular functional
trait of the group, and particular groups having overlapping functional specializa-
tions (i.e., degeneracy) are selected by pre-de¯ned connections after ontogenesis
(Edelman & Gally, 2001). Gierer (1988) has suggested the possibility of a genetic
contribution toward \¯ne tuning" of neuronal connections, although this is a mis-
conception because DNA encoding through explicit speci¯cation is associated with
formation of structural changes and not the dynamics that ultimately govern brain
function. Genetic evolution is itself the result of selectionist processes involving
millions of years (i.e., phylogenetics) and not the life-span of an individual organism
(i.e., epigenetics) as speci¯ed by neural Darwinism. For instance, DNA duplication
errors in a gene SRGAP2 have lead to structural changes enabling greater neural
connectivity that may have in°uenced cognition (Dennis et al., 2012). Therefore the
self-referential qualities are not hard wired meaning that qualia are a conscious
function that is subject to distortion as for example under hallucinatory drugs.
Based on selectionism (Edelman, 1987), cognitive semantics that are °uidly en-
grained within the neural structure as a dynamic ¯eld of in°uence requires no
information processing. Semantics/meanings also involve relational thoughts and
their processing in related neural networks. They are represented in brain and
involve many brain areas. The related physical (electro-chemical) signals from
various brain areas interact and integrate at lower levels. In other words, brain
structures, functions and subjective experiences related to semantics/meanings are
entangled to form subjective conscious experiences or qualia.
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2.3. Cognitive function
Brain dynamics allow monitoring brain activities thus providing a mechanistic un-
derstanding of brain functions (i.e., cognitive functions and uncognized functions) to
be adaptive to the environment and other pressures speci¯cally tuned to the indi-
vidual organism or its self-referential properties thereby allowing for subjectivity to
emerge. The dynamical interactions in the brain remain predominantly dependent on
the structural or physical integration with functional integration being in°uenced by
environment, which is the resultant e®ect of qualia in the aconscious attributed to
such dynamical interactions. To understand subjective experiences as cognized brain
functions, a hierarchically driven functional organization actualizes the subjective
experiences through the metastability of an evolving dynamical information °ow
aided by selective and adaptive processes from the self-referential organization.
Neural correlates of subjective experiences can be understood in ontological, but not
in an epistemological sense therefore cognitive brain functions allow for subjective
conscious experience to be actualized and a function can have neural correlates such
as determined by fMRI. Putative continuity of dynamical processes across spatio-
temporal scales is relevant for projecting cognitive function to bring about hierar-
chical physical integration due to their recurrent interconnections within neural
networks in a quasi-syncytial environment, which undergoes a continuous change via
chemical modulation and serves as a dynamical ¯eld.
The formation of a relational organization relies on associative memory (i.e., new
signals invoking old responses) and in particular on the ability to integrate concepts.
In other words distantly related information is organized in long-term memory by
integrating concepts to related concepts stored in short-term memory. A relational
organization is the information that has been stored and retrieved associated with
physical concepts involving cognitive semantics derived from the process of hierar-
chical integration. Cognitive semantics from the viewpoint of relational organization
is semantic entailment in the brain of physical interactions caused by forces. The self-
referential qualities that are expressed in terms of functional integration are actuali-
zation of subjective conscious experiences or qualia. Qualia belong to the ¯rst-person
ontology. Subjective experiences are uncognized manifestations of functional inter-
actions leading to the cognizability of perception of subjective experience. These
functional interactions reconcile the epistemological qualities with ontological con-
siderations within a uni¯ed hierarchical-functional organization that comes about as a
causal account of a relational organization that derives from physical integration or
hierarchical integration in which dynamical interactions involving information
transfer form associable representations. In living organisms, such physical interac-
tions are compounded by a set of functional interactions that can be quantitatively
described in terms of cognitive functions. Cognitive function is from the viewpoint of
hierarchical-functional organization de¯ned as functional entailment in the brain of
both functional interactions and physical interactions. The physical aspect of brain
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operation is referred to as objective third-person ontology. The functional aspect of
the same brain operation is the subjective ¯rst-person ontology.
Semantics yield distinct content from both ¯rst-person ontology (functional-as
functional interactions) and third-person ontology (physical-as neural correlates).
Both ontological states reinforce each other however data from both are used with a
diversity of meanings. Like, we feel the existence of similar subjective state (¯rst-
person ontology) in others by the presence of our own sensation however, the
subjective sensation varies greatly in individuals. The functional aspect enables the
realization of subjective experience to be cognizable by coalescing with the hierar-
chical-functional organization. Subjective conscious experiences are cognizable func-
tions arising from functional integration within a self-referential organization and a
hierarchically based functional organization that derives from both functional inte-
gration and hierarchical integration. We need to be clear why the term integration can
be either hierarchical or functional. At the hierarchical integration stage, all physical
information is transformed since dynamic interactions are no longer responsible for
information transfer of physical information. The integration of each hierarchical level
of functional organization may invoke non-computational procedures, especially from
the molecular to the cellular level (Penrose, 1995). One suggestion is microtubules
harnessing a quantum e®ect or quantum coherence preserved across the cortical
laminae that could generate a pressure or self-organizing force higher up in the hi-
erarchy (Hamero®, 1994a, 1994b). The integration process of creating functions across
each hierarchical level of a neural (structural) organization based on \hierarchical
functional organization". How is each level of a functional organization established? It
was suggested ¯rst by Globus (1992) that neuronal function is produced hierarchically
at each level by pressures, cytoplasmic, chemical or dynamic. Other evidence points to
a hierarchically driven functional organization created not only dynamically, but
selectively (Bauer & Dicke, 1997). Since functional organization may include a self-
organizing process that is both selectionist and hierarchically driven, all functional
interactions across various hierarchical levels yield emergent complexities of di®erent
functions with distinct characteristics, and therefore through integration form a
metastable continuum (Fingelkurts et al., 2009).
Cognitive functioning requires both segregation and integration of information
(such as in a main complex in thalamocortical neural networks for consciousness
(Tononi, 2008, 2012)) from across spatiotemporal scales, resulting in changes to
synaptic connectivity over broad areas of cerebral cortex leading to the formation of
dynamic ¯elds of neural activity that form neuronal groups or cell assemblies.
Analyzing cognition requires a good grasp of how the brain integrates separated tasks
into a coherent function. Higher cognitive functions (e.g., language, thinking, plan-
ning, reasoning, problem solving, and free will) are in°uenced by the electrochemical
signature of the neocortex through various cortical connections (e.g., associative,
commissural and projection ¯bers) and pathways de¯ned on the basis of the neu-
rotransmitter used (e.g., cholinergic, serotonergic, dopaminergic and noradrenergic
pathways). This electrochemical signature also guides dynamical continuity with
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synaptic transmission at assemblies of neural networks in the neocortex without
intrinsically altering the network.
3. Realization of Subjective Experiences Through Complex
Interactions Between Energy Fields
The underlying complexity of events leading from genes to cognition as functions
comparable to metabolism would provide us only with a catalytic process, unifying
energy with structure in a uni¯ed theory of metabolism (Davia, 2006). There needs to
be another layer of complexity in terms of energy ¯elds to understand where and how
consciousness originates.
Popper et al. (1993) was ¯rst to suggest that the electromagnetic energy wave ¯eld
could represent the aconscious mental functions based on interactionism. Popper
proposed that electromagnetic energy wave ¯eld residing in the aconscious is sub-
jective experience capable of interacting with subjective conscious experience
through a physical force ¯eld acted upon by the electromagnetic energy wave ¯eld.
Interactionism in this sense does not imply an immaterial–material dualism or sub-
stance dualism which might violate conservation laws of physics. In their interpre-
tation of Popper's interactionistic hypothesis, Lindahl & Arhem (1994) proposed a
triple-aspect model with two levels of interactions: the ¯rst between a certain spa-
tiotemporal pattern of action potentials and an electromagnetic energy wave ¯eld
representing the aconscious mind; the other between the electromagnetic energy
wave ¯eld and the conscious mind representing a quale (Fig. 2).
Others like McFadden (2002a,b) proposed that information from neurons is
integrated to form a conscious electromagnetic energy wave ¯eld. According to
McFadden (2013), such an endogenous macroscopic electromagnetic energy wave
¯eld as consciousness can in°uence brain function. This would suggest consciousness
has causal actions on the brain. The alternative is that the magnetic ¯eld component
Fig. 2. Sir Karl Popper's triple-aspect monistic model adapted by B. Libet as a conscious \mental"
¯eld as functional in nature. The boxes on the right refer to the terminology used here. Adapted from
Orsucci (2009) with permission of the publisher (World Scienti¯c Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.).
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has no causal in°uence on physical behavior. For example, during sleep, the electrical
activity is rampant indicating the existence of a magnetic ¯eld, yet consciousness is
absent. This indicates that consciousness is not an electromagnetic ¯eld as claimed by
McFadden (2013). Furthermore, at present there is no in vivo experimental evidence
to indicate a viable endogenous microscopic electromagnetic energy wave ¯eld. Most
if not all the experimental data are based on tissue/brain endogenous magnetic ¯elds
(Cifra et al., 2011; Buzsaki et al., 2012). Therefore, it would be unlikely that a
magnetic ¯eld component of the electromagnetic energy wave ¯eld could have a
direct role in consciousness because the magnetic ¯eld can alter cognitive function as
for example during transmagnetic stimulation (cf. Snyder et al., 2003), but since
consciousness has no causal powers, and if the °ow of electrical charges distributed
within neurons generates a dynamic electric ¯eld with a low magnetic ¯eld considered
to be negligible (under quasi-electrostatic conditions) then the dynamics of charges
are predominantly by electrical interactions in terms of protein polarization (Poz-
nanski & Cacha, 2011). This is supported by Lindsay et al. (2004) derivation of
Maxwell's equation for neuronal modeling where it was shown that large scale phe-
nomena are usually dominated by magnetic ¯elds and the electric ¯eld is less im-
portant, while small scale phenomena are usually dominated by electric ¯elds and it is
the magnetic ¯eld which is less important. This would suggest that an electric energy
¯eld has a role in consciousness at the single neuron level.
Our hypothesis assumes that the collective interactions in neurons have su±cient
macroergic e®ect to produce su±ciently strong electric energy ¯eldsb for electronic
excitations to take place on the surface of endogenous structures via alpha-helical
integral proteins as electro-solitons (Brizhik, 2008). These electro-solitons carry an
electric charge moving in-between alpha-helical integral proteins of macromolecules.
Similar endogenous microscopic electromagnetic energy wave ¯elds are considered to
be propagating in the cavity of microtubules, transporting and carrying information
(Sataric et al., 1992). Solitons are self-localized robust and long-lasting solitary waves
that do not disperse and preserve their identity as they travel through a medium 
are ubiquitous in nature. Subsequent radiative relaxation or decay of electro-soliton
waves propagating through a medium such as the intracellular space, transfers en-
ergy via interactions with DNA in the nucleus to induce conformational changes
producing the spontaneous emission of ultra weak, non-thermal radiation referred to
as coherent biophotonsc (Popp et al., 1984, 1994; Popp & Chang, 1998). Interaction
between the electric ¯eld and DNA results in conformational changes to DNA
molecules resulting in con¯ned spaces similar to photonic crystal structures that are
an ideal substrate for a quantum e®ects to instantiate coherent biophotons in the
vast majority of neurons in the brain which can form a biophoton ¯eld since it is
bCortical action potentials of  1ms refractory periods could bring on strong electric ¯elds. This di®ers with plant
cells and cardiac muscle cells having action potentials in the refractory range of  10 s and  250ms, respectively;
while skeletal muscle cells have compatible refractory periods to neurons but they lack gap-junctions or electrical
synapses required for a uni¯ed ¯eld to emerge.
cThis name was originated by Fritz-Albert Popp.
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radiation of light there is near instantaneous communication throughout— referred
to as quantum coherence. The binding of the biophoton ¯eld may involve a Fr€ohlich–
type condensate proposed for any system far from equilibrium surrounded by a
thermal bath, with the presence of a non-thermal energy source (Fr€ohlich, 1968).
However, coherent biophotons emissions occur in the non-thermal part of the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum at ultra low frequencies (Fig. 3) and is referred to as DNA
excimer radiation (Li, 1992).
The coherence of biophotons stems from the result of electric energy ¯elds prop-
agating in the intracellular space or cytoplasm as solitonic transmission with collective
dynamics (Giudice et al., 1988). The electric ¯eld does not need to be coherent; it is
the intracellular °uid that creates coherency in the presence of an electric ¯eld. If
biophotons are produced from a coherent ¯eld then their frequencies will be more
closely correlated than biophotons produced from a non-coherent ¯eld from exciplex
states of DNA molecular interactions. Coherent biophotons are produced by an
electric ¯eld and not a random chemical process (Popp et al., 2002). Yet, any such
coherent biophoton ¯eld generated in neurons would only maintain its coherence for
an extremely short time because of decoherence (Tegmark, 2000). What it means is
that the emission of coherent biophotons upon interaction with DNA must then
re-emit almost continuously before decoherence takes e®ect in order to maintain the
Fig. 3. The electromagnetic spectrum showing the positioning of biophoton emission in the ultra weak,
non-thermal and non-ionizing range of the spectrum. The spectral region in which biophotons are
emitted ranges in frequencies from 200 nm to 800 nm (Popp et al., 1994).
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biophoton ¯eld unless there is a Fr€ohlich–type condensate or nature has developed
photonic crystal structures made up of DNA molecules enabling the instantiation of
coherent biophotons in the vast majority of neurons in the brain which can form a
biophoton ¯eld. If each cell is emitting biophoton ¯eld, then the whole living organism
is, in e®ect, a resonating biophoton ¯eld  a ubiquitous non-local ¯eld. And since
biophotons are the entities through which the entire brain can readily communicate
information, there is near-instantaneous intercommunication throughout. A biopho-
ton ¯eld occurring spontaneously throughout the whole brain will provide an infor-
mation character of the electric coherence, and hypothetically allow for the possibility
of a uni¯ed consciousness to emerge (Van Wilk et al., 2007). There are real life
examples, which indirectly support consciousness as uni¯ed and nonlocalized. For
example, children born without cerebral hemispheres remain self-aware of their im-
mediate environment (Shewmon et al., 1999; Merker, 2007). Thus consciousness
through self-awareness appears to be possible with only a midbrain and a hindbrain
intact. Another example occurs when an anesthetic molecule enters into the lipid
phase of the membrane and makes the membrane more °uid-like, which can result in a
weak macroergic e®ect possibly due to lack of action potentials ¯ring that inhibit
electronic excitation for the emission of coherent biophotons.
Although coherent biophotons are emitted through quantum mechanical e®ects
upon interacting with DNA, exciplex states of DNA in the cell nucleus of neurons can
trigger chemical reactions. The emission of non-coherent biophotons originates from
oxidative metabolism (chemical reactions) of exciplex states of DNA as a byproduct of
these chemical reactions. These non-coherent biophotons occur in every cell in the body
where chemical reactions take place andmay play a role in actualizing self-awareness in
the brain. Neurons continuously produce non-coherent biophotons during their me-
tabolism (Isojima et al., 1995; Kataoka et al., 2001; Kobayashi et al. 1999; Rahnama
et al., 2011) and the source of non-coherent biophotons derives from oxidative me-
tabolism ofmitochondria and lipid peroxidation (Thar &Kuhl, 2004). Excited states of
macromolecular structures in neurons can also be a catalytic process generally associ-
ated with the presence of an oxidative metabolism that accompanies the production of
reactive oxygen species (ROS) which participate in the regulation of a wide spectrum of
biochemical and physiological functions. Biophotons are produced by normal chemical
processes, just as the well-known phenomenon of bioluminescence. A distinct non-
coherent emission of photons as byproducts of metabolism, like thermal radiation and
bioluminescence/chemiluminescence caused by radical reactions, oxidation etc such
biophoton emission refers to the phenomenon of constant and spontaneous emission
due to metabolic activities, without excitation or enhancement. This biophoton
emission can also re°ect a pathophysiological state with respect to mitochondrial en-
ergy (ATP) production and the susceptibility to oxidative stress which is derived from
the excessive production of ROS or a lack of activity for antioxidant protection.
How quantum electrodynamics produces this phenomenon which we call self-
awareness in the brain? We believe that brains have evolved to utilize both the wave
and particle properties of electromagnetic energy ¯elds not only for self-awareness, but
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also to transform objectivity to subjectivity. Here objectivity in terms of electro-
magnetic energy wave ¯eld is regarded as a smooth, continuous ¯eld, propagated in a
wavelike manner, but transformed into subjectivity through complex quantum
interactions of subcellular energy ¯elds, where energy is understood to have a funda-
mentally subjective aspect in nature. The transition enabling objectivity to be
transformed into subjectivity entails representation of DNA codon sequences as fre-
quency patterns of energy ¯elds re°ected upon the uniqueness of their braiding pat-
terns that would serve as a \quantum tape" to emulate consciousness; at which upon
scanning of the \quantum tape" reveals the self-referential character of the brain
through °uctuation of ambient potentials in the electrolytic °uid representing the
intracellular domain of neurons (cf., Green & Tri®et, 1997).
The instantiation of coherent biophotons facilitates the conduction of a biophoton
¯eld which is in turn realized as a conscious ¯eld when it becomes actualized by self-
awareness as a result of re-absorption of biophotons by exciplex states of DNA that
serve as a \feedback" mechanism to release non-coherent biophotons emissions
leading to metabolic activity and energy transfer across proteins in macromolecules
as a result of protein-ligand binding (Turton et al., 2014). It entails DNA chromo-
somes acquiring unlimited information from metabolic activity that in turn produce
regulative electric ¯eld signals as feedback. This is assumed to be the subcellular loci
for the opening for self-awareness that allows for objectivity to have access to sub-
jectivity in the aconscious. In other words, we claim that self-awareness comes to
fruition as DNA re-absorbing biophotons in the aconscious where it is recalled to
consciousness in a way similar to the role of potentialities describing the passage of
potentiality to an actualization. The resultant conscious ¯eld that instantaneously is
uni¯ed through protein conformation changes guiding biophoton communication in
neurons (Sun et al., 2010) and in-between neurons through electrical synapses and
across synapses in networks of neurons in the cerebral cortex (cortico-thalamic sys-
tem) and subcortical areas (e.g., midbrain and hindbrain) thus providing an infor-
mational character of the electric coherence. The brain is privileged to provide self-
awareness not possible in other biological organs where biophotons may be emitted
since the conscious ¯eld embroils a large number of speci¯cally designated functional
areas in the brain that require energy to be actualized in tandem with the traditional
electrochemical communication.
The spark of consciousness is a quantum event being the result of quantum co-
herence through biophoton emission due to DNA re-absorption and energy transfer
created by metabolic energy that is stored as a form of coherent excitation. It is these
coherent excitations that are considered responsible for generating and maintaining
long-range order via the conduction of the energy ¯eld interactions which give access
to subjectivity occur at the timescale too fast to those based on integration of neural
information. For example, neuron ¯ring of action potentials in the millisecond range
does not re°ect upon the subjective conscious experiences that occur on much faster
timescales driven by solitonic transmission on timescale of 5 107 s (Sataric et al.,
1993) as opposed to neural dynamical timescales of 5 103 s. Yet when protein
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polarization is taken into account, neurons no longer operate too slowly for quantum
coherence, dismissing the idea of too short decoherence time of biophotons1013 sec
(Tegmark, 2000).
In an earlier attempt to explain hard problem in terms of quantum consciousness,
it was pointed out that quantum e®ects are insu±cient (Smith, 2006, 2009). Energy
is intrinsically qualitative so, for example, the qualitative feeling of seeing \red" is a
form of physical energy. The uniqueness of frequency patterns of energy ¯elds
re°ected upon the DNA codon sequences braiding patterns and the regulation of
electric ¯eld signals from metabolic activity by feedback from DNA chromosomes
acquiring unlimited information could therefore suggest that the re-absorption of
biophotons by DNA plays a role in what earlier quantum consciousness researchers
had not observed. Indeed the resultant conscious ¯eld is attributable to the e®ect of
specifying qualia by such a \feedback" mechanism throughout the brain and in
speci¯c networks of neurons that are constantly transforming into more stable
associable representations as \molecular" solitons. Biophotons are absorbed by DNA
Fig. 4. A schematic °owchart of the neurobiological quantum phenomenon leading to self-awareness
through biophoton ¯eld as a soliton forming a uni¯ed conscious ¯eld and metabolic energy activity
leading to subjectivity as Davydov solitons in macromolecules forming a functional ¯eld in the acon-
scious. The hard problem is how any objective explanation can explain subjective phenomena given that
objectivity seems not to have direct access to such phenomena. Such an indirect access that links the
ontologically subjective experience with epistemologically objective concepts is the aconscious. Sub-
jectivity seems to originate at a di®erent interface  between quantum electrodynamical interactions
in DNA and the residual complex interactions resulting from such events, and how these modi¯cations
to DNA molecules provide the means for photonic crystal-like structures to instantiate coherent bio-
photons through a quantum e®ect and subsequently as the carriers of subjectivity.
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producing exciplex states in DNAmolecules where intrapeptide vibration amide-1 are
excited at an end of alpha-helical protein molecules that release amide-1 vibrational
energy for transport of metabolic activity in macromolecules as Davydov solitonic
transmission (Scott, 1985). Davydov solitons (Davydov, 1991) provide self-regulation
ofmetabolic and coherence of the guiding electro-solitons (Brizhik et al., 1998).Aswell,
Daydov solitons are referred to as a \molecular" solitons because they are considered to
be moving in between macromolecules that provide the energy and charge transport
during metabolic activity (Tuszynski et al., 1984). It should be clear that any external
stimulation by light penetration of the cranium (cf. Goodman, 1983) would normally
elicit non-coherent biophoton emissions that do not regulate neither the conscious
¯eld nor the aconcious functional ¯eld as biophotons do not interact whereby any
external in°uences of light that would normally pass through without any e®ect. The
Davydov soliton may play a role in formation of a functional ¯eld in the physical
observation of subjective experiences in the aconscious from the feedback or re-
absorption of biophotons by exciplex states in DNA for eventual recalling to con-
sciousness as qualia. The change from objectivity to subjectivity is a quantum me-
chanical phenomenon that is brought about by the interaction of an electro-soliton
with DNA to spontaneously emit a biophoton ¯eld as a soliton, propagating by way
of protein–protein biophoton interactions inside neurons and in-between neurons
through electrical synapses and across neurons through chemical synapses forming a
uni¯ed conscious ¯eld (Fig. 4).
4. Metastability of Subjective Experiences Through Matching
of Resonant Dynamics
A uni¯ed consciousness either exists at the entire cortical level (John, 2001) or pri-
marily in the thalamocortical region (Llinas et al., 1998). According to McGinn
(1995), the di±culty comes from consciousness being nowhere and everywhere in the
brain, thus not amenable to the methodic reductionist analysis. Sigmund Freud in
1895 wrote about neural networks driven by non-physiological energy forces that
altered conscious processes. Such a Freudian viewpoint can be modernized (Solms &
Turnbull, 2002). For instance, associable representations in the brain, as selectionism
maneuvering dynamic continuity by an adaptive pressure from which higher cogni-
tive functions result from such activity in assemblies of neural networks and from
which subjective experiences as metastable and uncognized phenomenon are realized
as a cognizable phenomenon.
Subjective experiences are the self-referential qualities that we directly experience,
and this is regardless of whether we are conscious or unconscious during sleep. This
suggests that subjective experiences can be either cognized functions or uncognized
functions depending whether one is associated with qualia through consciousness.
For example the subjective conscious experience of pain, is a cognizable phenomenon.
However, the process of transduction, transmission, and modulation associated with
perception of pain, are based on empirical methods that reveal objective physical
272 L. A. CACHA & R. R. POZNANSKI
J. 
In
te
gr
. N
eu
ro
sc
i. 
20
14
.1
3:
25
3-
29
2.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.c
om
by
 W
SP
C 
on
 0
7/
29
/1
4.
 F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
aspects such as neural correlates of various conscious experiences, that do not directly
reveal epistemological, self-referential qualities, such as qualia.
Subjective experiences are represented in terms of a functional ¯eld that super-
venes upon the integration of dynamic interactions and which is a continuum of
functions that are hidden from the external world in the aconscious to be recalled to
consciousness as qualia through functional integration. Dennett (1991) states that
higher-order functions must necessarily supervene upon the lower-order functions.
Such supervenience requires the existence of hierarchical levels driven by less and
less sophisticated functional organization. No such problem exists if in a particular
functional organization there is a continuum of functions as an aconscious functional
¯eld. For instance, perception, memory, emotion, thinking and creativity are all
functions arising from dynamical interactions in the aconscious. In the same way
unconscious handling of information in the brain is uncognized, but becomes cog-
nizable when recalled to consciousness and thus, cognition occurs. Subjective
experiences are brain functions that are cognizable, yet no amount of physical in-
formation can capture the subjective raw qualities of conscious experience (the
qualia) whose meanings cannot be fully understood. Hence there exists an episte-
mological gulf between descriptions of physical events in the brain and the subjec-
tive experiences that are presumed to be associated with those events. Thus,
functionalism is not robust enough to explain individual di®erences in qualia (Block,
1994). A problem with the non-uniqueness of qualia to a particular function is that
functionalism asserts subjective experience can be realized independently of the
functional ¯eld in the brain. This in our view contradicts, the fundamental idea of
supervenience that requires no change in the subjective experience without change
in the underlying structure. If there is a mapping from a set of self-referential
qualities to neurobiological processes, then the functional ¯eld realization is uniquely
possible.
A functional ¯eld can be actualized by brain processes that can have the ability to
express subject experience with ¯rst-person ontology. Therefore subjective experi-
ences come from functional properties of the brain. And functions arise out of the
inter-connectedness of the brain through dynamical interactions. A functional ¯eld
supervenes upon the dynamic interactions that occur within the neuronal processes of
the brain (Freeman, 2007). The mestable dynamic interactions invoking associable
representations in brain processes are uncognizable in space and time which means
not repressed and not recalled to consciousness, i.e., aconscious which is outside of
consciousness and physical processes. The dynamical interactions metastabilize (cf.
Kelso, 1995; Fingelkurts & Fingelkurts, 2004; Freeman & Holmes, 2005; Fingelkurts
et al., 2009) and cognize in the process of realization of the subjective experiences in
the brain.
A viable alternative is that functional ¯eld supervenes upon dynamical interac-
tions that give rise to Davydov solitons that mediate energy dissipation as a process
of catalysis (Davia, 2006). Solitons are a continuous phenomenon, and are localized
within a region and can interact with other solitons, and emerge from the collision
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unchanged. Thus the qualitative nature of consciousness relates to correlations of
subjective conscious experience supervening upon dynamic and relational properties
of solitonic transmission that is realized by localized ontological phenomenon that
uni¯es the epistemological aspects through nonrepresentational cognitive seman-
tics. Such interactions give access to subjectivity spontaneously that do not require
an integration process. The objectivity of these dynamical interactions is trans-
formed into subjectivity by a \switch" caused by the wave–particle duality de-
scription of quantum mechanics when an electric energy wave ¯eld interacting with
DNA results in coherent biophoton emissions that are re-absorbed by DNA to
produce metabolic activity that can through dynamic ionic interactions involving
macromolecules be transposed as Davydov solitons to bring about an aconscious
functional ¯eld.
The realization of uncognized brain functions into cognized higher brain functions
follows the process of resonance (Golant, 1989; Grossberg, 1999, 2007). Resonance is
an organizational reservoir of potential changes to neural dynamics without any
speci¯c structural re-organization. The concept of resonance in neural systems con-
cerns the topology and includes the tendency for maximum potential of organization.
Resonance occurs when bottom-up patterns of neocortical excitatory activity as
Davydov solitonic transmission are \matched" with top-down expectations as dy-
namic pressure that is in°uenced by the environment. This bottom-up/top-down
resonance lasts longer and is more ampli¯ed than any individual activation with
resonance. The process of matching involves selecting bottom-up signals then what
keeps the selected signals from reactivating their top-down expectations in a contin-
uous cycle of bottom-up and top-down interaction. It is suggested that the type of
interaction involves higher-order thoughts (\thoughts about thoughts") (Rolls, 1997)
or self-recognition (Orpwood, 2007), which for example, can explain painfulness
because it assumes that the state of each entity has physical aspect and segregable
functional aspect of a state of that entity. When a pain related stimulus activates the
pain receptors, feedforward signals are generated. These signals interact with cogni-
tive feedback signals that also have physical and segregable functional aspects. The
segregability is the supervenience of the functional on the physical. This functional
aspect related to the feedback signal also contains the state related to subjective
experience painfulness in superposition with other states related to other subjective
experiences. The conscious aspect such as a quale is actualized by an aconscious
functional ¯eld that supervenes upon the dynamical interactions governed by Davy-
dov solitons. For example, happiness–sadness functions cannot supervene from
structure alone; they depend on dynamic interactions, but the feeling of being happy
or sad cannot be explained by subjective experiences and must be related to other
relational organization that are based on physical laws for recalling to consciousness as
subjective conscious experience or qualia. A schematic illustration of the process
whereby Davydov solitonic transmission as an associable representation arising from
the aconscious form qualia is shown in Fig. 5.
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5. Selection of Subjective Experiences Through Functional Interactions
and Biological Laws
The functional ¯eld supervenes on the dynamical interactions involved with dy-
namical continuity and dynamical adaptability as a Davydov soliton, which leads to
the \emergence" of a uni¯ed experience of \red object slowly moving from left to
right" through resonance. It is emphasized that subjective experience is the realizer of
the functional ¯eld, not the functional ¯eld itself which means there is a process
(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 5. A schematic illustration of solitonic transmission as a dynamical associable representation of
subjective experiences arising from the aconscious to form qualia. Subjective experiences as a resonant
phenomenon that emerge as a functional ¯eld whereupon \matching" of top-down (feedback signals)
expectations and bottom-up (feedforward signals) processes during the attainment of a self-referential
organization through dynamic adaptability. (a) The learned expectation of a triangular representation
from top-down adaptive pressures as a discontinuous set of discrete events in time that is incognizable.
(b) Without resonance, there is inadequate matching of the top-down adaptive pressures and the
bottom-up neural signals. The solitonic transmission results in a highly metastable and uncognizable
associable representation of a subjective experience as indicated by the arrows. (c) Feedback relation-
ships among neurons by way of adaptive resonance unifying top-down expectations with bottom-up
solitonic transmission of neural signals that result in an associable representation of a quale. The
dissipative solitonic triangle is not a representation, but an ontological phenomenon that uni¯es the
epistemological aspects as resonance develops. The characteristics of the dissipative soliton are of
molecular origin involving metabolic energy (Davydov, 1973, 1991). Adapted from Davia (2006) with
permission from the author.
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leading to the functional ¯eld. This integration of functional interactions entails se-
lection of speci¯c subjective experiences. There are functional interactions in each area
for the detection and discrimination of function related to each of motion and color.
Then there are functional interactions between two related functional units. The
integration of all these functional interactions forms an aconscious functional ¯eld of
an uni¯ed experience of `red' moving object.
The brain as a biological organ has a physical aspect because of its structure and a
biological aspect because of its function (Chauvet, 2004). The physical aspect con-
cerns with physical interactions relating the structural organization of matter
without a®ecting its functional organization. Biological aspects are an abstract
description of the underlying functional processes in terms of a set of functional
interactions. In supervenience, biological aspect cannot be changed without
altering some physical aspect. The related concept of physical realization involved no
biological properties that can have nonphysical realizations (Kim, 1998), being
compatible with functionalism. We use concepts such as \emergence" (Chalmers,
2006), \supervenience" (Kim, 2009) to explain subjective experiences that may ap-
pear to be less mysterious as long as both concepts are appropriately \unpacked" in
terms of selection. Let us take an example of \red object slowly moving from left to
right". There are three physical attributes, namely velocity and direction of motion
and long wavelength re°ected light representing red color. There are two functions,
namely, detection/discrimination of motion and that of color. Signals from retina
travel to V1 and eventually get segregated to neurons of color area V4/V8/VO and
motion area V5/MT for speci¯c analysis (Vimal, 2008, 2010).
Subjective conscious experience can only be conceived under speci¯c conditions
regardless of the extent of knowledge garnished on the complexity of the operational
mechanisms. First, the existence of functional interactions is the ¯rst condition for
conscious self-experience in nonliving matter. Whereas the action of physical forces,
which are symmetric in nature, lead to structural stability in nonliving matter, the
existence of functional interactions leads to an increase in specialization and hier-
archization resulting in a decrease in resonance. Finally the integration of functional
interactions must allow for the propagation of non-local functional ¯elds according to
the relationship between the topology and the geometry of the neural system.
Even though this does not imply that all living organisms support qualia, it is
obvious that rudimentary forms of self-awareness exist in lower forms of life
(Feinberg &Mallatt, 2013). Clearly from the perspective of evolution of living matter
there is an additional characteristic which is required for qualia. The consensus is for
biological organisms to behave like complex adaptive systems with ability for self-
replication of functional interactions. To understand complex adaptive systems, one
needs to understand how models can induce the topology of the biological system.
Using topological methods, Rashevsky (1961) was able to analyze the functional
organization of any living system to understand biological laws. One such biological
law is the idea of self-replication of functional interactions that brings about their
integration in terms of a functional ¯eld. This distinguishes a conscious organism
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from an arti¯cial system. In an arti¯cial system, like a robotic machine with a
supercomputer brain, every function is entailed by another function, thus an in¯nite
regress exists, but in conscious organisms the in¯nite regress does not exist when
there is self-replication of functional interactions (Rosen, 1991). It is therefore
charlatanism to conceive conscious robots.
Brain structure is made of organic matter and encapsulated within skulls of higher
vertebrates that evolved consciousness through 500 million years of natural selection
(Feinberg & Mallatt, 2013). Brains are part of the evolutionary nexus that is gov-
erned by both non-heredity and DNA self-replication through explicit speci¯cation
mechanisms that allow the self-referential character of the brain to express subjective
experiences. Therefore subjective experiences are more than self-awareness in some
vertebrates or pure reactions in invertebrates. Evolution theory facilitated by
degeneracy in biological systems (Edelman & Gally, 2001) represents a conceptual
idea in understanding how subjective experiences in neuronal systems evolved by
natural selection. Thus our premise is the necessity of biological laws as an evolu-
tionary stratum applied to living matter over physical laws for nonliving matter.
Biological laws apply to all living organisms made of cells having evolved from
physical processes and are not only restricted to excitable cells of the nervous sys-
tems. Accordingly living organisms obey biological laws of organization and func-
tioning that di®er from physical laws in nonliving matter. The structural
organization of nonliving matter is deduced from the combination of forces acting on
elementary physical structures. In living organisms, such physical interactions are
compounded by a set of functional interactions that enhance the reliance on infor-
mation transmission without the processing of information. Living organisms are
open systems with continuous exchange of energy with the environment and are
intrinsically heterogeneous; they possess a property of self-organization and self-
replication. They are in a state far from thermodynamic equilibrium. Their evolution
is phylogenetic and not epigenetic because upon the achievement of complete
thermodynamic equilibrium, all the proteins of a living organism disintegrate. In
nonliving matter, thermodynamic entropy cannot but increase with time, leading to
an increase in molecular disorder. As such it follows that biological laws cannot be
reduced to physical laws, but since biological laws are a compounded form of
physical laws, they cannot \di®er" from physical laws because physical laws cannot
be violated.
Schr€odinger (1944) was the ¯rst person to suggest that new laws are expected in
biological or living organisms:
\. . . in short, that from all we have learnt about the structure of living
matter, we must be prepared to ¯nd it working in a manner that cannot be
reduced to the ordinary laws of physics".
Biological laws describe the right compromise between complete order and com-
plete randomness. What this means is that some unpredictability allows biological
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laws to kick in. If there is too much order from complex biochemical interactions to
the evolution of organisms and even through to the functioning of the brain, then the
emergence of consciousness could not take place. Likewise, if there is too much
randomness from complex biochemical interactions to the evolution of organisms and
even through to the functioning of the brain, then the emergence of consciousness
could not take place. This suggests that the resolution of subjective experiences in
neocortical functioning cannot be emulated without an understanding of the un-
predictability of biological laws. In nonliving matter, the biological aspect which
constitutes function that potentially leads to the capability of expressing subjectivity
is latent since nonliving matter is inert. (This excludes some forms of energy in
Nature.) Living organisms such as mammals and in particular primates have hier-
archically driven functional organization that is su±ciently complex to sustain
subjective experiences. Biological laws govern the complexity for the realization of
subjective conscious experiences. In the absence of highly complex synaptic con-
nections among neurons with rich dynamics, it would be unlikely that subjective
experience exist since the functional interactions would be seriously underdeveloped,
most likely latent and limited to quantum-generalized processes.
Fundamental characteristics of living organisms such as asymmetry and inho-
mogeneity are well-known examples of laws' (Chauvet, 1993c,d). Biological laws
explicitly include the property of nonsymmetry (Chauvet, 1993c) between the
sources and sinks involved in functional interactions and the property of non-locality
in its dynamic organization (Chauvet, 1993d). The nonsymmetry of the action from
source to sink, which implies a local transformation in the sink, and the non-locality
of the action in space, which arises from the hierarchical structure. Biological non-
locality is the representation of activity and how it results from the continuity in both
space and time, underlying hierarchical physical integration. So, the hierarchy
describes a speci¯c physiological process at each level, coupled with processes
evolving in adjacent levels. Chauvet (1993a,b) has proposed to describe these
physiological systems in terms of the nonsymmetric and non-local interactions from
sources to sinks, with transformations in the sink which correspond to distinct
dynamical ¯elds. This is the case of action potentials from neuron to neuron at
synapses and is referred to as hierarchical integration (Chauvet, 1993a). Rosen's
relational biology (Rosen, 1958, 1991, 1998; Rashevsky, 1961) has been extended by
Chauvet (1996) to include concepts of hierarchical and functional integration.
For instance, if the product of a functional interaction such as an ion, destined to
modify, for example, the ionic charge of a molecule, moves from a source to a sink,
then there must exist some mechanism of transport, e.g., an ionic gradient. Thus, the
concept of functional interaction involves, in mathematical terms, the action of a
¯eld operator on a variable emitted by the source. The ¯eld operator acts on the
variable, the value of which undergoes a transformation because of the source.
Functional interactions have a role analogous to that of a force in physical interac-
tions with symmetry and locality in place. Forces can only operate when the medium
is homogeneous (Chauvet, 2002). Living organisms contain structural discontinuities
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between which functional interactions take place. Functional interactions induce the
topology of the biological organism, i.e., the functional organization of the biological
organism (Chauvet, 1996, 2002). Topology considers space and time and continuity,
while geometry in°uences the dynamics of the process, corresponding to the
spatiotemporal functional organization. Thus geometry as a metaphor for qualia
(Balduzzi & Tononi, 2009) does not entail the presence of dynamic continuity and
hence there can be no integration of information. It may be that some physical
systems have dynamic continuity, but they lack the property of nonsymmetry, which
is referred to as the unidirectional transfer of substances or signals between structural
units of the system in its functional organization (Chauvet, 2002).
6. Is Sentience in Artifacts Possible?
Sentience is a minimalistic way of de¯ning arti¯cial consciousness without the
requirement for biological laws. Complete emulation of the brain will be unable to
produce sentient robots or any other kind of sentient system because to claim that,
the brain computes is to show that it performs computations and many of its func-
tions can clearly be represented algorithmically. However, \sentience" refers to the
raw subjective perceptual experience which is noncomputable even when the per-
formance of all the relevant functions is explained through algorithms. This is be-
cause sentience cannot be algorithmically represented through information theory
and a \brain in a supercomputer" model based on information theory and compu-
tation is not going to yield the integration across scale that is needed to faithfully
reproduce sentience for the reason that the topology included in such a model would
be comprised. In other words, for subjective experiences to be actualized, there is an
ingredient that such \brain in a supercomputer" could never possess  the topo-
logical nature of neural systems. The stabilizing nonsymmetric functional interac-
tions de¯ne the topology of the system being modeled.
Consciousness is not reproducible in silicon or any other nonliving matter, since
the ecology for consciousness must follow biological laws as opposed to physical laws.
Consciousness requires energy and the complex energy ¯eld interactions would di®er
in nonliving matter. The interaction of biophotons within exciplex states of DNA is
inclusively occurring in living matter and there is no guarantee that such can be
e®ectively reproduced in man-made quantum computing machines. As such any
theory that suggests consciousness is integration of information (Tononi, 2004) based
on identity theory of problematic materialism undermines the tenets of ¯eld theory of
integrative neuroscience. Consciousness as an integrator of information is °awed
conceptually because consciousness is not a process and is non-computational so
consciousness as a biological phenomenon cannot be integrated or be a physical
entailment of an integration process as suggested by integration of informa-
tion theory. The framework of the integrated information theory of consciousness
(Balduzzi & Tononi, 2008) is based on discrete dynamical systems which is totally
incompatible with the integration process that is supposed to lead to a biophoton
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theory of consciousness. If the only reason why consciousness is not reproducible in
silicon is due to the complexity of nonliving matter, then it should be possible in the
near future to extract silicon from rocks and with precision engineering this com-
ponent can participate in a machine that displays arti¯cial intelligence by performing
Boolean operations in a process that is called computation. In the fabrication of
conscious subjective experiences in silicon, assuming the detailed complexity of brain
operations are known a priori, the machine would also be required to implement
biological laws in a process that is called biological computation. This is of course
false since the functioning of our brains di®ers fundamentally from information
theoretic consciousness as we have shown herein.
Over half a century ago, Eccles (1952) considered the brain to be a machine
operating not according to biological laws, but the laws of physics and chemistry
where a \ghost" operated the machine resulting in a dualist mind–brain liaison.
Recently, the computational doctrine that the human brain is an information pro-
cessing system and that thinking is a form of computing has been largely discredited
(Hales, 2011; Manzotti, 2012). Conscious sentient awareness as a computation
(Dehaene et al., 2014) is just as fallible. According to Reeke & Edelman (1995)
sentient artifacts may be possible, but they will certainly not be computers
that process information. When should physical processes give rise to sentience?
Pereira Jr (2013) claims that subjectivity arises with a kind of natural phenomenon
that can be found in many natural substrates, such as ionic solutions, energy waves
and nylon strings that exhibit \temporal" amplitude modulation. In brain activity,
there is an important split of amplitude-modulated (AM) processes in time and
space. Neurons display temporal amplitude modulation only in dendritic (graded)
potentials, not in axon (action) potentials. Patterns embodied in spatially distributed
AM dendritic ¯elds can be integrated by the astroglial network, since the latter
displays large-scale waveforms (Pereira Jr., 2013). As a consequence of the above
reasoning, once engineers insert a wavelike substrate in a machine, suitably con-
nected with the computational machinery and being a®ected by the content of
the processed information, they would bestow subjectivity upon the machine. The
machine could construct a machine-like subjective experience of the world.
7. Conclusion
The emergence of consciousness is not a macro-quantum e®ect, involving supercon-
ductivity, super-°uidity, electromagnetic ¯elds, Einstein–Bose condensation, super-
°uorescence, luminescence or quantum vibrations of microtubules. We proposed a
physical basis of consciousness based on complex interactions of subcellular energy
¯elds. In particular, the interaction between the electric ¯eld and DNA results in
conformational changes to DNA molecules which guide the biophoton energy ¯eld in
a way similar to photonic crystal structures that are an ideal substrate for a quantum
e®ect to instantiate coherent biophotons in the vast majority of neurons in the brain
that form a biophoton ¯eld, as a consequence of it being radiation of light there is
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near instantaneous communication throughout the brain  referred to as quantum
coherence. The biophoton ¯eld is realized as a conscious ¯eld when it is actualized by
self-awareness in the aconscious as a result of re-absorption of biophotons by exciplex
states of DNA chromosomes acquiring unlimited information from metabolic activity
which in turn produce regulative electrical ¯elds as a \feedback" mechanism of
energy transfer across proteins as a result of protein-ligand binding during protein-
protein communication. We clearly articulate why the brain is speci¯cally privileged
to support a biophoton ¯eld theory of consciousness.
The genomic-based energy ¯eld theory of consciousness removes the elusiveness of
¯nding the mechanisms underlying consciousness-related binding (Revonsuo &
Newman, 1999). Since the uniqueness of frequency patterns of energy ¯elds is a
re°ection of the DNA codon sequences braiding patterns. However, the physiology
underlying the function of consciousness is incompletely understood. In this regard,
we have gone about explaining the nature of subjectivity of brain function in terms of
metabolic activity and energy transfer. In particular, subjectivity instantiates as a
resonant phenomenon arising from interactions between biophotons with exciplex
states of DNA resulting in metabolic energy transfer in and between macromolecular
proteins as subcellular signaling governed by Davydov solitonic transmission leading
to a functional ¯eld that encompasses selected subjective experiences that are ac-
tualized through functional integration as qualia.
Finally a triple-aspect monistic model was derived in order to cognize the incog-
nizability of the \steam" of consciousness in our quest to solve the hard problem of
consciousness. In our endeavor, we have postulated that interactionism and not
information theoretic views based on computation govern subjectivity in higher-
order brain functioning. This can be viewed as an extension of the non-computational
cognitive neuroscience paradigm pioneered by Globus (1992), while it certainly does
satisfy the criteria for such a viewpoint, further research will be required to experi-
mentally verify our claims of a genomic instantiation of consciousness in neurons
through a biophoton ¯eld theory.
Appendix: De¯nitions of Some Terms
Aconscious  refers to the unconscious that is not repressed nor directly retrievable
to consciousness.
Biophotons  is a photon of non-thermal origin emitted from a biological system or
ultra-weak biological photon emissions; photons are massless elementary particles of
null charge.
Biophoton emission  is the release of coherent photons from cells as a process of
radiative relaxation of electro-solitons. Non-coherent release can be from exciplex
states of DNA or as byproduct of metabolism.
Causality  (also referred to as causation) is the relation between the cause and the
e®ect where the e®ect is understood as a consequence of the cause.
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Cognitive function  is a brain function recalled to consciousness via psycho-
physiological storage embedded in the functional organization and causally reducible
to cognitive semantics.
Cognitive semantics  is the study of meaning. It focuses on the relation between
signi¯ers, like words, phrases, signs, and symbols, and what they stand for, their
denotation.
Complex adaptive system  consists of interactions that govern the complex
dynamics through biological laws whose collective behavior exhibits emergent
properties, i.e., the interactions lead to new properties of the system as a whole.
Cognized function  is a brain function causally reducible to cognitive processes.
Conformational change  a transition between macromolecular conformations in-
duced by many factors.
Consciousness  is a physical state of self-awareness realized by quantum coherence
in the brain and actualized by DNA re-absorption of biophotons and the resultant
e®ect of energy transfer across proteins by protein-ligand binding in neurons.
Conscious function  is a cognized function arising in the aconscious within the
functional organization that has been recalled to consciousness.
Darwinian process during ontogenesis  self-organizing process based on selection
of random variation.
Degeneracy is an evolution theory where relational property between two or more
structures where functional redundancy facilitates evolution.
Developmental selectionism  Darwinian processes carried out in the brain during
ontogenesis.
Davydov soliton a molecular soliton that can be used as a dissipative soliton in the
sense that on a short time scale dissipation of spatial transfer of vibrational energy
can be neglected, and on a long scale the amplitude of the soliton will decay and
¯nally vanish.
Dynamic adaptability  adaptability of dynamical pressures selected from either
environmental in°uence (i.e., stimuli), past experience or behavior (i.e., a form of
learning) leading toward the formation of self-referential qualities.
Dynamic continuity  continuous spatiotemporal patterns of information °ow
carried by the electric energy ¯eld inside neurons and across synapses (e.g., as a result
of a change in the electrochemical signature at an appropriate hierarchical level).
Dynamic connectivity  a dynamic association of neurons under chemical and
cytoplasmic pressures leading to the formation of neuronal groups or assemblies
through the alternation of dynamic continuity by changes to synaptic e±ciency and
hence synaptic connectivity.
Electro-solitons  solitons that carry an electric charge (i.e., an electric energy wave
¯eld).
Emotions  are the physiological and behavioral responses to subjective conscious
experiences (or qualia).
Entropy  is an organizational change in a physical system.
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Entanglement  the phenomenon of two or more segregated entities sharing a brain
state.
Exciplex state short lived complex formed between di®erent molecules when one is
excited by a biophoton.
Explicit speci¯cation  morphogenesis leading to function determined by a pre-
existing plan where each neuron has a speci¯c \address" guided by extracellular
forces and the DNA in cell nucleus.
Feedback  interactions occur in both directions within the brain and between the
brain and its environment.
Functionalism suggests that structural changes may not entail functional changes
and requires a holistic view of functions as being separate (i.e., independent of
structure) and/or not supervening (i.e., come from the structure in all aspects).
Functional interaction  is a dynamic interaction which leads to a particular fuc-
tional role; it is also de¯ned mathematically as three elements: (i) the source, (ii) the
sink and (iii) the transformation within the sink that possesses nonsymmetry and
non-locality properties.
Functional ¯eld  is a speci¯c grouping of neural systems in which chemical reac-
tions associated with metabolic activity arise from the dynamical interactions in the
brain.
Functional integration  is the resultant e®ect of speci¯cation of qualia during the
integration of functional interactions.
Functional organization  mapping as a result of functional integration at various
hierarchical levels (each hierarchical level of organization is assumed to be locally
connected to the next higher level).
Incognizable  a form of dynamical interaction (not a brain function) that is
causally irreducible to cognitive processes.
Intentionality  is the ability to have thoughts \about" something.
Hard problem  is how the subjective-experience can be described objectively.
Macroergic e®ects  collective interactions leading to electronic excitations in
macromolecules.
Metastability  a transitory epoch in which an initial con¯guration coalesces into a
¯nal con¯guration.
Nonreductive functionalism  subjective experiences can only be de¯ned non-
reductively, in terms of the general pattern of their interactions with one another i.e.,
subjective experiences arise from integration of functional interactions and not from
individual functions.
Ontology  mode of existence.
Qualia  is a conscious function that is a quantum phenomenon of raw sensation of
subjective conscious experiences (sing. Quale).
Re-entry refers to the inter connectivity and exchange of signals between neuronal
groups.
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Relational organization  includes all relations between material parts, relations
between the e®ects of interactions of material parts, and relations with time and
environment.
Reductionism  one-way process of reduction whereby global phenomena can be
understood to be a collection of various hierarchically linked local phenomena that
a®ect the overall global phenomena.
Relational organization  mapping as a result of integration of dynamical inter-
actions at various hierarchical levels (each hierarchical level of organization is as-
sumed to be locally connected to the next higher level).
Resonance  is the optimum change to a functional organization of a neural system
in which transfer of excitation occurs naturally.
Segregation  we can interpret it as in embryology, where the di®erentiation of a
new structure still retains the unity with the whole.
Sentience  is the ability of any entity to have subjective perceptual experiences,
without necessity of biological laws.
Selectionism  is synonymous with evolution by natural selection (or Darwin's
theory of natural selection).
Self-awareness  is an immediate subjective sense of being; that is, a moment-by-
moment sense of one's existence, a sense one is alive, that one is awake; this can be
equated with what is consciousness.
Self-organization  process where random or non-algorithmic changes manifest
themselves into a coherent organized activity (i.e., synergetics).
Self-referential organization  the ontological embodiment of epistemological
aspects of a complex adaptive system.
Subjective conscious experience  is a quantum phenomenon of biophoton ¯eld
interactions appearing when the aconscious subjective experience is recalled to
consciousness and therefore is actualized.
Subjective experience  is a quantum phenomenon of biophoton ¯eld interactions
and the realizer of functional ¯eld brought about during the functional integration
arising from resonant dynamical interactions in the brain.
Supervenience  is used to describe cases where properties (i.e., often structure
dependent) of a system are consequent on the existence or establishment of another
(i.e., can be traced back \a posteriori to the structure).
Synaptic connectivity  a static and physical association of neurons connected
through chemical synapses generated.
Synaptic plasticity  changes in transmitter release or biophysical properties of the
synapse as a result of correlated activity between pre- and post-synaptic cells (also a
kind of Hebb synapse).
Uncognized function  is a brain function arising in the aconscious within the
self-referential organization that is not represented and has not been recalled to
consciousness.
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